CSE authors receive Distinguished Paper Award at USENIX Security for research on geoblocking

The award recognizes the excellence of their work examining geoblocking in the context of the Cuba embargo.
An image of planet earth from space with blurred strings of code and other data scattered around it and in the background.

CSE researchers have been recognized with a Distinguished Paper Award at the 2024 USENIX Security Symposium for their paper titled “Digital Discrimination of Users in Sanctioned States: The Case of the Cuba Embargo.” Authors on the paper include CSE PhD student Anna Ablove; recent grads Shreyas Chandrashekaran, Ram Sundara Raman, and Reethika Ramesh; former postdoctoral researcher Hieu Le; external collaborator and professor of public policy with a special focus in sanctions Harry Oppenheimer; and Prof. Roya Ensafi. All are affiliated or collaborate with Ensafi’s Censored Planet lab.

One of the leading international conferences in computer security and privacy, USENIX Security brings together the world’s top researchers to share the latest findings and developments in the field. The Distinguished Paper Award is given to a select number of outstanding papers at the conference; this year, just 15 out of more than 400 papers appearing at the conference, selected from over 2,000 total submissions, received the award.

In this paper, the researchers take on a pressing but understudied topic in the field of security, that of geoblocking, which refers to the restricting of internet access and content based on a user’s geographical location. Geoblocking can take the form of government censorship, as well as voluntary blocking of users in specific regions on the part of websites, such as Spotify, Zoom, and more. Their study is one of the first-ever user-centered analyses of how economic sanctions contribute to geoblocking, focusing on the U.S. embargo against Cuba as a case study.

To evaluate how U.S. sanctions influence web content inaccessibility in Cuba, the authors performed network measurements on over 10,000 domains, drawn from the Tranco Top 10K domains and others identified from a user questionnaire. They used TCP and TLS traceroute measurements and examined HTTP(S) responses to determine whether and how geoblocking is implemented across network layers.

Through their in-depth analysis, the researchers identified 546 geoblocked domains, which lacked transparency both in measurement and user notification. Notably, the vast majority of geoblocked domains did not inform users why they were blocked, and some misled users by appearing accessible when they were not.

These findings demonstrate a significant lack of transparency regarding the impact of sanctions on digital access in Cuba, as well as a need for greater communication and clarity about geoblocking among users, service providers, and policymakers.

Overall, the research team’s study highlights the need for greater transparency and standardization in how web content is restricted due to sanctions, with the goal of reducing digital discrimination and enhancing global information access.